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Review Essay 
Mimetic Faces: On Luiz Costa Lima's 
The Control of the Imaginary 
Alberto Moreiras 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
In his Afterword to The Control of the Imaginary Jochen Schulte-Sasse 
elaborates a critique of mimesis that apparently goes against the very heart 
of Luiz Costa Lima's argumentation. For Schulte-Sasse artistic imagination 
in modernity "can no longer be perceived as mimetic in the sense of an 
artistic appropriation of reality" (220). Art as revelation is fully dependent 
upon the existence of a transcendent anchor for human life. The post- 
Enlightenment practice of art, founded as it is on expressiveness, has a 
negative function insofar as it resists "the atrophy of thinking by the 
conditioning force of instrumental reason" (220). Mimesis can only work in 
favor of the legitimation of social power: "If modern art is indeed institu- 
tionalized in such a way that our commerce with it is compensatory in 
nature, then any effect a socially relevant, i. e., mimetic content might have 
will a priori be defused by its mode of institutionalization" (219). In my 
opinion, however, Costa Lima's elaboration of the notion of mimesis allows 
for a different interpretation of this problematic. 
In Mimesis e modernidade (1980) Costa Lima offers a definition of 
mimesis that can function as the framework for his intellectual enterprise: 
"Mimesis, presupposing a similarity with the real understood as the pos- 
sible, is a means for the self-recognition of the community, that is, an 
instrument of social identity" (21).1 The link between mimesis and commu- 
nity will give us a privileged point of entry into The Control of the Imaginary. 
The book itself, as I see it, responds to endemic problems in Latin American 
critical circles regarding the political function of art, and in particular the 
contribution of literature to the constitution of social identity. By studying 
mimesis, Costa Lima does not want Latin American literature to fall into the 
trap of devoting itself, and therefore limiting itself, to the hopeless task of 
reproducing moralizing recipes for social and political redemption under 
the pretext of a recourse to the real, understood as the reality of oppression. 
On the other hand, and precisely by studying mimesis, Costa Lima wants to 
free literature, from a theoretical perspective, into the full scope of its 
intrinsic possibilities, up to and including a fundamental resistance to the 
understanding of its capacity as merely compensatory in nature. Mimesis, 
in the sense in which Costa Lima understands the term, does not primarily 
bespeak an appropriation of reality in the work of art, but an entrance into, 
and a dwelling in, the order of the real.2 1
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In "Critical Fanonism" Henry Louis Gates Jr. identifies a situation of 
impasse or double bind which clearly plagues theoretical thinking about 
what he calls the "colonial paradigm" (457): 
You can empower discursively the native, and open yourself to charges 
of downplaying the epistemic (and literal) violence of colonialism; or 
play up the absolute nature of colonial domination, and be open to 
charges of negating the subjectivity and agency of the colonized, thus 
textually replicating the repressive operations of colonialism. (462) 
In my opinion, Costa Lima's concern with mimesis represents a sustained 
attempt to break out of this impasse. lie himself mentions the importance 
of mimesis for the postcolonial world: 
Mimesis is also a question for those of us who live in the periphery [para 
quem tem a periferia canto seu lugar]. . Since, traditionally, mimesis is 
translated out of imitario, our mimesis becomes imitation of an imita- 
tion, taking us to value our cultural products according to their 
conformity with metropolitan patterns. Or, if we are rebellious to them, 
according to their disconformity.... In both cases, the assessment of 
colonial mimesis does not depend upon the matter on which it feeds- 
let us provisionally call it "life," or "reality"-but upon the metropoli- 
tan pattern, which dictates how "reality" must be "imitated" or inter- 
preted. (Mimesis 2) 
Whether we are for or against "metropolitan patterns," Costa Lima is 
telling us, we remain caught in the spiderweb of imitation and all its 
dependent problematic. Whether we decide that the colonial subject can or 
should develop a discourse of resistance or we deem such a subject entirely 
exhausted by colonial oppression, it is still mimesis understood as imitatio 
that rules our thought and forces us to follow ourselves into a dead end. 
In our historical context, reviving mimesis means first of all breaking 
away from imitatio, therefore in a sense repeating a gesture begun but not 
totally carried out by European Romanticism. Mimesis in poststructuralist 
times is, for Costa Lima, the figure of a break. In the first chapter of The 
Control of the Imaginary Costa Lima retraces the history of mimesis as 
imitatio in order to show that imitatio was in fact forgotten as a regulative 
idea after "the passage from an aristocratic, estate society to a national, class 
society articulated by the scientific spirit" (45). If expression replaces 
imitation for Romantic poetics, it is clear that "the romantic cult of 
individual expression transformed itself into the immanentist aesthetics 
that dominated uncontested the first sixty years of the present century" 
(45). Now that immanentist aesthetics have reached a fundamental crisis (a 
crisis which Costa Lima finds all the more evident "after the vogue of 
structuralism"), it is time, he thinks, to return to the old concept whose 
erroneous translation ruled several centuries of Western poetics. This 2




schema already hints at the fact that what is at issue is not so much a return 
to mimesis as a return of mimesis. In other words, it is not that we return to 
mimesis, but that mimesis comes back to haunt our accomplished 
immanentism. 
The return of mimesis depends then upon the breakdown of moder- 
nity the exhaustion of the expressionist poetics which are a corollary of a 
subject understood as res cogitans. "From the moment when the originally 
Nietzschean and later Freudian critique of the doctrine grounded in cogito 
ergo sum was disseminated, ... the conditions were created under which 
precisely what mimesis implies could be rethought" (133): "In concrete 
terms, mimesis is a strategy directed against the indissolubility of the 
presence of the 'self" (133). 
As a strategy against fixed selves, mimesis is first of all a rendering of 
difference and not of identity. For mimesis to become expressively produc- 
tive "the mimetizing object must elicit not only the indispensable clement 
of the mimetized agent's identification but also that agent's own recogni- 
tion-not necessarily a conscious recognition-of the resistance that is 
being presented to it: recognition of the mimetizing source's difference" 
(185). 
The emphasis on difference, no doubt surprising to the traditional 
theory of mimesis, indicates that a source other than Aristotle is being put 
to use. The source is Freud, to whose notion of identification Costa Lima 
refers briefly but decisively. According to Freud, there are three basic 
possibilities for identification: identification with a rival object, implying the 
desire to take his or her place; identification with a love object, implying the 
desire to be possessed by her or him; and an identification, more mysterious, 
which "entirely leaves out of account any object-relation to the person who 
is being copied" (Costa Lima 49).3 The existence of this third kind of 
identification grounds the whole mechanism upon the mere desire of 
putting oneself somewhere else: this third identification is what Walter 
Benjamin would refer to abstractly as "the mimetic faculty." What Costa 
Lima here emphasizes is the fact that what is essential in identificatory 
mimesis "is not its nature as copy or substantive trace but the process of 
transformation that is in operation" (49). "What is decisive in the constitu- 
tion of mimesis . . . is the creation of a staging, which is not so much the 
repetition of a model as the organization of a response to that model" (50). 
Under these determinations it is hard to see how Schulte-Sasse could 
have taken it for granted that a defense of "the mimetic nature of art" was 
equivalent to a defense of the "artistic appropriation of reality" in the 
subjectivistic, agential sense. Rather, following the logic of Costa Lima's 
admittedly abrupt articulations, we could say that mimesis is for him a 
displacement into the other, in which the other, which only appears in the 
form of a wound, forces a response which, far from being an attempt at 
appropriation, is first of all a pure staging of desire: the pure form of 
staging.4 3
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This is not to say that Costa Lima's theory of mimesis runs counter to 
that of Aristotle. It does not run counter to it, but it is not identical with it 
either: "Obviously," he says in the preface to the English edition, "there can 
be no way to recuperate ... and restore the Greek sense of mimesis, for the 
very mentality of modern times, and within it the way that physis is con- 
ceived, has dramatically changed" (viii). But there is a crucial aspect of the 
Aristotelian notion of mimesis which, although repressed and forgotten in 
the traditional understanding of mimesis as imitatio, is precisely what is 
recuperated in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as a staging: "Aristotelian 
mimesis presupposed a concept of physic (to simplify, let us say of "nature") 
that contained two aspects: natura naturata and natura naturans, respec- 
tively, the actual and the potential. Mimesis had relation only to the possible, 
the capable of being created-to energeia; its limits were those of conceiv- 
ability alone" (22). However, the field of conceivability, which sets the stage 
for the deployment of mimesis, does not coincide with the field of desire. 
Conceivability here is desire mediated by the possibility of expression, the 
possibility of construction of a socially articulable mimema. As Costa Lima's 
intention is to speak about mimesis as articulated in the literary artwork, he 
calls "the fictional" the artistic product of mimesis. The fictional is for Costa 
Lima the artistic mimema. 
Before going on to discuss the fictional and several related notions, I 
would like to comment briefly on Benjamin's essay on the mimetic function. 
Although Costa Lima does not refer to it explicitly, there are grounds to 
argue that it is a major text in the genesis of Costa Lima's version of the 
concept. In any event, it will give me the chance to point out several crucial 
implications of The Control of the Imaginary. 
The human capacity to see resemblances, Benjamin says, "is nothing 
other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to 
become and behave like something else" (333). This old compulsion, which 
we have already seen invoked in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as staging, 
is undergoing, according to Benjamin, a historical change: "The direction 
of this change seems definable as the increasing decay of the mimetic 
faculty" (334). This decay, in Benjamin's idiolect, does not testify to an 
absolute waning, but rather to a transformation, much like what happens to 
his notion of artistic "aura" in the age of mechanical rcproduction.5 The 
transformation of the mimetic faculty follows the lines of a progressive 
abandonment of cosmology as an "ethical" discipline. "Nevertheless we, 
too, possess a canon according to which the meaning of nonsensuous 
similarity can be at least partly clarified. And this canon is language" (334). 
Benjamin's notion of nonsensuous similarity, developed from the idea 
that "the whole of language is onomatopoeic" (335), has been misunder- 
stood, but most of all disregarded in the context of an appreciation of 
mimesis. I will argue that it is of extraordinary importance: it gives us the 
possibility to lay the radical claim that mimesis "under conditions of 
modernity" is still a means to enter the order of the real. Benjamin does not 
claim that nonsensuous similarity is a referential function in the conven- 4




tional sense. On the contrary, its meaning is circumscribed, as it can be 
understood as merely the material field of mediation "between the spoken 
and the signified but also between the written and the signified, and equally 
between the spoken and the written" (335). Benjamin's strongest thought 
comes in this: 
The mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest itself only 
through a kind of bearer. This bearer is the semiotic element. Thus the 
coherence of words or sentences is the bearer through which, like a 
flash, similarity appears. For its production by man-like its percep- 
tion by him-is in many cases, and particularly the most important, 
limited to flashes. It flits past. It is not improbable that the rapidity of 
writing and reading heightens the fusion of the semiotic and the 
mimetic in the sphere of language. (336) 
It follows that mimesis does not seek an appropriation of reality, but 
that it forms the conditions under which the real-in a flash-can come into 
the mimetic exchange. Schulte-Sasse maintains that one of the premises of 
the mimetic notion of art is "the effacement of the materiality and arbitrari- 
ness of language" (224). He is clearly operating under the notion of mimesis 
as imitatio. In Benjamin's, and Costa Lima's, understanding, the materiality 
of language becomes crucial to mimesis, for it is there that the possibility of 
nonsensuous similarity resides. Nonphenomenal materiality, to use an 
expression coined by the late Paul de Man, is the key to the mimema's, or, 
if you will, the fictional's presencing of the real .6 
Costa Lima follows Jean -Paul Sartre in considering the imaginary "one 
of the two forms of thematization of the world" (the other one being the 
perceptual) (ix). "Between mimesis and fictional precipitation," that is, 
between mimesis and the mimema,"lies the imaginary" (ix). The imaginary, 
in concordance with the mimetic faculty's desire to be always somewhere 
else, thematizes things as absent. This is what Costa Lima names "the 
negation of the imaginary," in a subjective sense: it is the imaginary that 
negates. But it is precisely because this negation by the imaginary concret- 
izes into the mimema, "because the fictional concretizes in a text that 
materializes in a signifying organization," that the fictional can be consid- 
ered a negation of the imaginary's negation: the materiality of the fictional 
is radically upheld, and it is indeed only thanks to it that the fictional can be 
considered "a critical use of the imaginary" (ix). 
In what sense is it critical? This question introduces the last aspect of 
Costa Lima's work that I want to comment upon before concluding this 
review wi th some critical remarks. Because the fictional is a critical affirmation 
of the imaginary, it is not primarily concerned with issues of truth. Or rather: 
its aletheological import is not one that goes through the choice between 
truth and falsehood. As a critical affirmation of the imaginary, and thus as 
a material opening into absence, the fictional interrogates or even solicits 
every truth. Costa Lima says that it "takes the appearance of a 'game' that 5
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does not contain the choice between true and false" (ix), just as Benjamin 
had asserted that "play" is the school of the mimetic faculty in the ontoge- 
netic sense (333). Herein resides the threat of the fictional, and therefore 
the cause of what Costa Lima identifies as the "veto," the "prohibition" or 
the "control" of the imaginary by the dominant discourses through history. 
It can now be stated that the translation of mimesis as imitario is not 
innocent: the verisimilar depends on what is, the actual, understood as the 
true, and so the traditional theory of mimesis, by putting the mimema under 
the sway of truth, forces mimesis to abandon its critical use, which radically 
depends upon imaginary conceivability. 
I started my presentation of Costa Lima's text by quoting a definition 
of mimesiswhich seemed togive it a preeminent function in the constitution 
of social identity. The link between mimesis and com mu nity stil I needs to be 
developed. It is here that I find Costa Lima's efforts objectionable, in the 
sense that I believe that he falls back upon mimesis as Unitutio precisely 
where it is most important that he resist it. 
If "mimesis ... is a process whose concretization is established under 
the form of fiction" (53), the limits of fiction depend upon psycho- social 
meaning. Costa Lima refers to the socialization theories of Marcel Mauss 
and Emile Durkheim, who had tried to establish that "to be socialized is 
... to internalize classificatory networks that locate the individual along the 
different scales . . . within the social environment. Mimesis is, first and 
foremost, one-or the-mode of learning socialization, that is, a mode of 
internalizing social values" (viii). It is in this context that we must under- 
stand the previously-quoted remark to the effect that mimesis operates as 
an instrument of social identity. 
We can see the need for this sort of gesture: without it, it would be 
difficult for Costa Lima to ground politically his critique of traditionally 
understood mimesis. The "new" mimesis, the one that Costa Lima is 
defining, by breaking away from imitatio as well as from a poetics of 
immanentist expression, would open the way to a new understanding of 
literature that would be in agreement with changed social expectations. This 
fact is particularly important for societies trying to get rid of an oppressive 
colonial heritage. Thus, even if mimesis is "the production of difference" 
(ix), 
it is, however, not an idiosyncratic difference similar to an idiolect but 
a socially recognizable, potentially acceptable difference. Recogniz- 
able and acceptable according to the expectations engendered in the 
members of a given community by the criteria of classification in force 
of that community. (ix) 
But we also see that this gesture creates a new impasse --or better, it 
returns us to the oldest of problems, which we can summarize as the conflict 
between logos understood as social authority and ethos understood as the 
habitation of a given community. "The criteria of classification" of any given 6




community ultimately depend upon the most obvious of all imitations, the 
imitation of authority. By invoking socialization as the limit of fictionality, 
Costa Lima unexpectedly reintroduces mimesis as imaatio: the fictional, at 
the end of Costa Lima's theory, must still be proper, in the sense of 
conforming to social expectations. But the proper, even within rapidly 
changing or even revolutionary societies, will not be dissociated from 
property, now understood not only as the control of the means of produc- 
tion, but also as the control of the very site of social territoriality: the site of 
ethics. 
Vince Gugino has recently demonstrated that this problem, which I 
take to be fundamental not only for Costa Lima's work, but also in terms of 
its importance for any attempts at a postmetaphysical literary and political 
thinking, is quite intractable within the frame of a theory of mimesis. 
After showing the probable etymological origin of mimesis in a constel- 
lation of terms meaning "change, exchange and substitution," Gugino 
remarks: 
As exchange and the entire ensemble of the associations of exchange 
(imitation, copy, representation, etc.), mimesis is not itself exchanged. 
Mimesis does not enter into the transaction, but walks off unaltered. 
This not -being -affected is the source of Plato's horror of mimesis and 
of his acceptance of its power. The power of mimesis is the possibility 
of exchange without reciprocity, an exchange which is instead unilat- 
eral, appropriative and ruling. (126) 
It is mimesis which defines property, not the mimetizing object or the 
mimetized agent, since "adcquation and assimilation of that which has been 
made like occurs as an appropriation of the differences of the material or 
being entering into the mimetic exchange" (128). 
It is therefore the very notion of mimesis as a staging that comes under 
question: "Mimetic space, as field, theatre or stage, or as chora . .. presents 
a question of where exchange happens and at the same time becomes that 
'where' or space created by mi met is exchange itself' ( 132). The spatializat ion 
of mimetic exchange comes to be seen in late Greek metaphysics, and in the 
subsequent philosophical tradition, as the political place. Costa Lima, as we 
have seen, agrees with this determination. But if the political place, the site 
of community, comes under the sway of mimesis, and if mimesis, as the 
staging effect, is the name of the non-participating appropriation (even if 
the mimetized agent is not itself e ffecting it, as we saw earlier), then it is clear 
that mimesis is also the field of determination of the ascendancy of the 
logical as ruling principle. Costa Lima may not be wrong in relating mimesis 
to networks of psycho-social meaning. But by placing that relation under the 
logos of socialization, Costa Lima's theory of mimesis cannot be but 
logocentric. 
Is it possible to pull mimesis apart from logos as absolute appropria- 
tion? Or, as Gugino asks, "can any political order exist without mimesis?" 7
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(121). Whether the question is answered positively, as does Gugino taking 
his point of departure in Anaxagoras' notion of met/lair ("participation"), 
or in the negative, as Costa Lima clearly implies, we must be aware of the 
fact that "reviving mimesis" is a double-edged enterprise. If on the one hand 
it allows for some leeway in the attempt to renew literary theory, if it can be 
made to become a central concept in the critical project of evaluation of 
works of art, and if it can, up to a certain point, threaten acquired modes of 
thinking whose exhaustion has become manifest today, is it legitimate to 
assert that a revived mimesis can inaugurate a radical break in literary 
thinking? 
I have postponed until now confrontation with a question that was 
already announced earlier. It has to do with Costa Lima's historical schema: 
having ourselves reached the accomplishment of the Romantic poetics of 
expressiveness, mimesis returns as a necessary task for thinking, but it 
should not return as imitatio. Why does mimesis need to return? Presum- 
ably, only because mimesis is the unthought in immanentist poetics. At the 
end of modernity, we must think modernity's unthought: that is, we must 
think the sense out of which modernity arises. For Costa Lima, breaking 
away from modernity cannot mean starting anew. It means precisely 
thinking about the break. How does the break figure in mimesis? 
Commenting upon what he calls "the first theory of literature" (76), 
that of Friedrich Schlegel, Costa Lima remarks that Schlegel rejected the 
possibility of a reunification of poiesis and mimesis. Schlegel held fast to a 
notion of poiesis as the "unconscious figuration" of genius (86) making it 
impossible "to overcome the conundrum that the postulation of autono- 
mous art has never overcome: the fact that the poietic product has no say 
about its own circulation and, therefore, about the way its social function is 
construed" (86). 
But Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has shown that poiesis as the figuration 
of genius is in fact perfectly consonant with the Greek notion of mimesis. Ile 
refers to Aristotle's Physics B 194a, "hi techni mimeitai ten phusis" ("art 
imitates nature") and to B 199a: "On the one hand, teciuil carries out 
(accomplishes, perfects, epitilei) that which physis is incapable of setting- 
into-work (apergasasthai); on the other hand, it imitates" (Limitation 23- 
24). This demonstrates the existence of a double conception of mimesis: 
mimesis can be restricted, and that would organize the reproduction of the 
given by or in nature; and mimesis can be general: 
It does not reproduce anything given (it does not reproduce at all), but 
... it supplements a certain default in nature, its incapacity of making, 
organizing, working-producing all. It is a productive mimesis, that is, 
an imitation of physic as productive fora or, if you prefer, as poiesis. 
(2A) 
But this general mimesis, given that it organizes the field of the Romantic 
poetics of productive genius, poses the need for the unconscious field of 8




figuration-the poet, or the comedian-to come as close as possible to the 
pure possibility of itself as precisely a field of figuration: in other words, the 
mark of genius would be the radical dis-appropriation of itself. This is what 
Lacoue-Labarthe calls the "law of improperty/Impropriety" (impropriEti) 
which is "the very law of mimesis" (27). 
The law of mimesis would then be paradoxical: itself a law of 
dispropriation, it posits itself as absolute propriation. This is in agreement 
with Schelling's interpretation of Greek tragedy. For Schelling the tragic 
hero-and Oedipus as its prototype-would "manifest his freedom by the 
very loss of his freedom" (47). HOlderlin would take this interpretation and 
place it at the very origin of speculative dialectics. With it, and in virtue of 
their fundamental functioning through the edifice of transcendental ideal- 
ism, mimesis and the mimetic exchange come to be "accomplished onto- 
theo-logy" (39). Which also means that they touch the very limit of 
ontotheology, and therefore the point of its catastrophe. Lacoue-Labarthe 
recognizes in HOlderlin's concept of "caesura" ("the pure word, the 
ant irhythmic interruption" [68]) the place where that catastrophe is named 
as such: a place of interruption, the figure of a break.? 
Mimesis returns, at the end of modernity, as the unthought in moder- 
nity. Mimesis is unthought because its catastrophic stance will not let itself 
be thought. As accomplished ontotheology, mimesis remains the task for 
thought: the mode of its return is not that of a resurrection. Rather, mimesis 
returns because, like Antigone's brothers, it has never been properly buried. 
Mourning for mimesis has not come to an end. Mourning is still 
unaccomplished. It will cause political disruptions. It already has. At the 
limit of modernity, insofar as the work of mourning is uneffected, mourning 
remains the task for thought. Thought cannot be but mourning: following 
the law of mimesis, which says that we cannot return to the proper unless we 
disappropriate ourselves from whatever has us haunted, that is, inhabited: 
for we still are, if posthumously, the mimes of /mhos, as Parmenides would 
have it. 
Notes 
1. Costa Lima's project has a prolonged life: it encompasses Mimesis e 
modernidade and the trilogy of which the book under review here is the first 
volume: 0 controle do imaginario,Sociedade e discurso ficciona1,0 Fingidor 
e o censor. Cf. also A Aguarrds do tempo. Estudos sobre a narrativa. The 
recent English edition of The Dark Side of Reason. Fictionality and Power 
translates essays from Sociedade and Fingidor, and includes some new 
material. For reasons of space I will limit myself to the discussion of several 
key concepts as they are articulated in The Control of the Imaginary. A fuller 
treatment would call for references to, for instance, chapter 5 of Sociedade 
and chapter 5 of Fingidor. I would also have liked to comment on Roland 
Sousa's Translator's Introduction to Control, but have not managed to do 
it in the space assigned to me. 9
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2. The most provoking recent contributions to the debate on mimesis that 
I know are to be found in Rend Girard, Violence and the Sacred; Jacques 
Derrida, "La double stance" and "Economimesis;" Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe, "Typographic" and L'imitation des modernes; Paul Ricoeur, 
Temps et rEcii, in particular the first volume; and Vincent F. Gugino, "On 
Ethos." Sec also in general Agacinski et al., Mimesis desarticulations. 
3. The references are to the Freudian notion of identification as developed 
in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. 
4. Lacoue-Labarthe also talks of mimesis as staging: "c'est essentiellement 
k theatre-le fait du theatre ou la thtatralite-qui rend raison dc la 
fonction generale de suppleance dtvolue a fart" (L'Imitation 25). 
5. Cf. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc- 
tion:" "That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura 
of the work of art" (221); he talks about the "decay of the aura" and its 
transformation in 222 passim. 
6. De Man develops the concept in "Phenomenality and Materiality in 
Kant." See comments in Gasche and Redfield. 
7. "La cesure du speculatir is the name of the essay where Lacoue- 
Labarthe basically develops the concept. But see also La fiction du politique 
41-47. Cf. also the related concept of "disaster" in Maurice Blanchot, The 
Writing of the Disaster, especially: "The disaster, unexperienced. It is what 
escapes the very possibility of experience-it is the limit of writing. This 
must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes. Which does not mean that the 
disaster, as the force of writing, is excluded from it, is beyond the pale of 
writing or extratextual" (7). 
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